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I. INTRODUCTION 
Gamblers wagered a staggering $4.9 billion dollars on sporting 
events in Las Vegas last year.2 In a recent survey, a majority of the 
American public stated that sports gambling should be legalized.3 
These trends show a clear rise in the popularity of sports gambling, 
yet many do not realize that gambling substantially contributes to a 
disproportionate decrease in the liberty of vulnerable populations.4 
Extensive research has shown that problem gambling is directly 
linked to income and geography.5 It is evident from this research that 
 
2.  A Look Inside the Numbers of Sports Betting in the U.S. and Overseas, 
SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL (April 16, 2018), 
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2018/04/16/World-Congress-
of-Sports/Research.aspx (explaining that the amount of money bet on sports in Las 
Vegas has risen every year since 2003 and is up 440 percent since 1984). 
3.  See Peter Moore, Americans: Gambling is Morally Acceptable and Should 
be Legalized, YOUGOV (Sept. 23, 2014, 8:36 AM), 
https://today.yougov.com/topics/lifestyle/articles-reports/2014/09/23/gambling 
(showing that 52 percent of Americans think that gambling in general is morally 
acceptable and 67 percent think that sports gambling should be legalized). 
4.  See Thijs Bol et al., Income Inequality and Gambling: A Panel Study in the 
United States (1980-1997), 34 SOCIOLOGICAL SPECTRUM 61 (2014) (arguing that 
income inequality increases the average expenditure on gambling); But see 
Elizabeth A. Freund & Irwin L. Morris, Gambling and Income Inequality in the 
States, 34 THE POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL 265 (2006) (“These results suggest that 
the increasing prevalence of various forms of nonlottery gambling will have little 
effect on income inequality.”). 
5.  Natale Canale et al., Income Inequality and Adolescent Gambling Severity: 
Findings from a Large-Scale Italian Representative Survey, 8 FRONTIERS IN 
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 2 (2017) (“Problem gambling also has a social and geographical 
gradient. For instance, adults experiencing gambling-related harm (i) live in areas 
of greater deprivation, (ii) are unemployed, and (iii) have lower income.”). 2
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there are a variety of issues of inequality that could expand as a result 
of state-sponsored sports gambling.6 
In Murphy v. NCAA, the Supreme Court held that the Professional 
and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”) §3702, which 
prevents States from “licens[ing]” and “authoriz[ing]” sports 
gambling schemes, violated the anti-commandeering doctrine.7 The 
anti-commandeering doctrine is the principle that the federal 
government cannot require states or state officials to adopt or enforce 
federal law.8 Congress cannot issue direct orders to the governments 
of the States because it is not an enumerated power within the 
Constitution. 9  The Court declared the entire statutory scheme 
unconstitutional based on this violation in §3702. 10  The Court’s 
opinion reinvigorated the proponents of the anti-commandeering 
doctrine and drove a wedge between federal and state law. 
Murphy v. NCAA highlights the stark conflict between federalism 
principles and the harmful effects of legalized sports gambling. 
Analysis and refinement of anti-commandeering is crucial because the 
doctrine will affect future jurisprudence of hot-button issues.11 This 
 
6. Les Bernal, Government Bookies Feed Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 
2014, 4:39 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/01/31/the-stakes-
off-the-field-and-at-the-betting-window/government-bookies-feed-inequality 
(“States would not only be promoting a destructive habit for millions of Americans, 
but transferring wealth from the have-nots to the haves.”) (emphasis added). 
7.  Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S.Ct. 1461 (2018); see 28 
U.S.C.A. § 3702 (1992) (“It shall be unlawful for—(1) a governmental entity to 
sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact, or (2) 
a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact 
of a governmental entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or 
wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the use of geographical 
references or otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which amateur or 
professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more 
performances of such athletes in such games.”) (emphasis added). 
8.  See Mike Maharrey, Anti-Commandeering: An Overview of Five Major 
Supreme Court Cases, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (May 23, 2018), 
https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2018/05/23/anti-commandeering-an-overview-
of-five-major-supreme-court-cases/. 
9.   U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing the 
enumerated powers designated to the United States). 
10.  Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1484 (“[W]e hold that no provision of PASPA is 
severable from the provision directly at issue in these cases.”). 
11.  See Steven Schwinn, Symposium: It’s time to abandon anti-
commandeering (but don’t count on this Supreme Court to do it), SCOTUSBLOG 
 3
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Article argues that the Supreme Court’s strict adherence to the anti-
commandeering doctrine—without taking into account the perverse 
effects on the personal liberty of underprivileged United States 
citizens—is unrealistic in today’s jurisprudence. 
Part I (A) of this Article outlines the Supreme Court’s creation and 
usage of the anti-commandeering doctrine over the last three decades. 
Part I (B) outlines the background of PASPA and its demise in 
Murphy v. NCAA, as well as a historical account of sports gambling 
in the United States. Part II (A) examines the reasons the Supreme 
Court struck down § 3702 of PASPA and the variety of effects it will 
have on the poorest in society. Next, Part II (B) psychological aspects 
of gambling and (C) the state budgetary incentives in the sports 
gambling context will be analyzed. Lastly, (D) potential future anti-
commandeering contexts will be explored, and most importantly (E) 
judicial solutions to combat the current inequitable balancing of 
federalism and policy interests will be outlined. Unpacking the case 
study of PASPA highlights that, when interpreting anti-
commandeering issues, the Supreme Court should realistically 
counter-balance policy issues against a strict and expansive adherence 
to the doctrine in order to protect the liberty of the most vulnerable in 
society. 
II. BACKGROUND OF ANTI-COMMANDEERING AND SPORTS 
GAMBLING HISTORY 
A. Maturation of the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Supreme 
Court Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence protects the dual 
system of government established in the Constitution.12 The Court 
formulated the anti-commandeering doctrine out of federal principles 
to meet this objective. 13  This relatively young doctrine was 
 
(Aug. 17, 2017, 10:44 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-time-
abandon-anti-commandeering-dont-count-supreme- court/ (discussing the 
unworkability of the doctrine). 
 
12.  See Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 
537 (2012) (explaining the constitutionally prescribed system of shared 
governance). 
13.  See Gregory R. Bordelon, The De-Federalization Gamble: A Workable 
Anti-Commandeering Framework for States Seeking to Legalize Certain Vice 
Areas, 20 ATLANTIC L.J. 103, 104 (2018) (“Generally speaking, the anti-
 4
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established in two Supreme Court cases: New York v. United States in 
199214 and Printz v. United States in 1997.15 This section summarizes 
the doctrine’s Constitutional roots and its formulation in these pivotal 
cases to clarify how it progressed to its current form. 
1. Dual Sovereignty 
The Constitution establishes federalism principles through a 
system of shared governance between Congress and the states.16 This 
dual sovereignty system sets out specific enumerated powers to the 
federal government and leaves the remaining powers to the states.17 
How to uphold this simple principle is one of “the oldest question[s] 
of constitutional law.”18 
The Constitution is the sole justification for a system of dual-
sovereignty. From an originalist perspective, state sovereignty is still 
a valid principle because the Framers of the Constitution intended for 
and required state ratification. In addition to this interpretive backing, 
the numerous benefits of this governmental system include, but are 
not limited to: (1) state government structures offer a testing grounds 
and competitive framework for developing the best legislation;19 (2) 
the variety of states allows for citizens to choose where to live based 
on their preferences;20 (3) it allows for more political accountability 
and participation;21 and (4) states provide a place where individuals 
 
commandeering principle prevents the federal government from using states as 
intermediaries to implement or execute law.”). 
14.  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
15.  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
16.  See Hu, supra note 12, at 537. 
17.  Id. at 546. 
18.  H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. 
L. REV. 633, 635 (1993) (quoting New York 505 U.S. at 149). 
19.  See Hu, supra note 12, at 546-47 (“State governments offer a multiplicity 
of regulatory regimes, which in turn provides both a testing lab and a competitive 
framework for developing the best policies.”). 
20.  See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 51, 57 (2004) (arguing that dual sovereignty creates regulatory diversity that 
benefits society).  
21.  See Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism 
Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1648 (2006) (“Rather, the key point is that 
state regulatory autonomy is needed to realize the values that federalism is typically 
thought to advance, including accountability.”). 5
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and groups can rally against national policies and federal overreach.22 
It is important to remember that these values can only be upheld in a 
dual-sovereign system if states have counter-balancing power against 
federal overreach.23 
In addition to governmental power being vertically distributed 
between federal and state government, it is horizontally spread 
between the three branches of the federal government.24 The judicial 
branch has increased its commitment to “polic[ing] the boundaries of 
federal and state power in order to ensure that any inroads on state 
sovereignty are proscribed.”25 This boom in judicial protections of 
dual-sovereignty has been called the “federalism revival” and has 
“breath[ed] new life into the [Tenth] Amendment’s seemingly truistic 
language.”26 The Court has the unique ability to restrain the power of 
Congress and states, not explicitly from the text of the Constitution, 
but from applying that “truism” to legislative action.27 This boom in 
 
22.  The Supreme Court consistently curbs the overstep of the federal 
government. See e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (explaining 
that the many benefits to decentralized government include that “it will be more 
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for 
citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and 
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by 
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”). 
23.  Id. (“Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of 
the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in 
any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal 
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”); but see 
Jose V. Romero, Jr., Pros and Cons of Federalist Set-Up, THE MANILA TIMES (Mar. 
17, 2018), https://www.manilatimes.net/pros-and-cons-of-federalist-set-up/386745/ 
(listing potential downsides to a weaker federal government, including: the 
protection of special interest groups (i.e. casinos), a greater disadvantage for poorer 
states and communities (i.e. gamblers), and obstructs action on national issues (i.e. 
the prevention of the spread of sports gambling)). 
24.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In the compound republic of 
America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct 
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and 
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The 
different governments will control each other; at the same time that each will be 
controlled by itself.”). 
25.  See Hu, supra note 12, at 548. 
26.  See Siegel, supra note 21, at 1630-31 (explaining judicial protection of 
federalism values and how best to protect state sovereignty).  
27.  United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (“The amendment 
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”); see also 
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
 6
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 41 [2020], Art. 1
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol41/iss1/1
Fall 2019] Shannon 7 
judicial protection of dual-sovereignty came to head in the 1990’s, 
with the Rehnquist Court striking down two laws on the basis of the 
anti-commandeering doctrine. 
2. New York v. United States 
Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 
1980 in order to mitigate an enlarging radioactive waste disposal 
problem within the United States.28 This Act allowed states to enter 
into interstate compacts or treaties restricting “the use of their disposal 
facilities to waste generated within member States.” 29  Congress 
believed the Act would encourage states to create formalized 
relationships in order to best dispose of radioactive waste.30 By 1985, 
only three states entered into formalized compacts. 31  Congress 
amended the law to incentivize more states to create mechanisms to 
dispose of low-level radioactive waste within their borders.32  The 
incentive at issue in New York, dubbed the “take-title provision,”  
mandated state compliance with the Act by January 1, 1996 or the 
state would be ordered to take ownership of all radioactive waste 
within its border and be liable for all resulting damage.33 
Two New York counties challenged the constitutionality of this 
incentive structure because citizens within their borders opposed the 
radioactive waste sites created in their home counties based on the 
Act.34 The Supreme Court upheld the first two incentives but struck 
down the take-title provision due to its violation of the anti-
commandeering doctrine.35 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, 
reasoned that “the Constitution has never been understood to confer 
upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to 
 
respectively, or to the people.”); New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57 (“The Tenth 
Amendment . . . restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from 
the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which . . . is essentially a tautology. Instead, 
the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject 
to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.”). 
28.  Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347, 1985 amendments at Pub. L. No. 99-
240, 99 Stat. 1842, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b et seq. 
29.  New York, 505 U.S. at 151. 
30.  Id. at 153. 
31.  Id. at 151. 
32.  Id. at 152 (“The Act provides three types of incentives to encourage the 
States to comply with their statutory obligation to provide for the disposal of waste 
generated within their borders.”). 
33.  Id. at 153–54. 
34.  Id. at 154. 
35. Id. at 175. 7
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Congress’s instructions,”36 and that the take-title provision “crossed 
the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion.”37 In sum, the 
Supreme Court struck down the take-title provision because States are 
not required to blindly follow the directions of the Federal 
Government.38 
New York is significant because it established the anti-
commandeering doctrine within Supreme Court precedent. 39 
Although the Court’s holding is limited to Congress’s ability to 
compel state legislatures, the Court would expand the doctrine to 
executives five years later in an equally important case, Printz v. 
United States. 
3. Printz v. United States 
Following the assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan, 
in which Press Secretary James Brady was nearly killed, the country 
gradually shifted towards stricter gun regulation.40 In 1994, Congress 
passed the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act41 which required 
the Attorney General of the United States to create a national 
background-check system by November 30, 1998.42 In the interim 
before this national system was established, a state’s chief law 
enforcement officer (“CLEO”) was required to perform the 
background checks.43 Arizona and Montana CLEOs challenged the 
constitutionality of the interim provision44 and the case eventually 
 
36.  Id. at 162. 
37.  Id. at 175. 
38.  Id. at 188 (“States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States. 
State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the 
Federal Government. The positions occupied by state officials appear nowhere on 
the Federal Government's most detailed organizational chart. The Constitution 
instead ‘leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,’ The 
Federalist No. 39, p. 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), reserved explicitly to the States by 
the Tenth Amendment.”). 
39.  See BORDELON, supra note 13, at 129. 
40.  Id.  
41.  Pub. L. 103-159 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 922). 
42.  Printz, 521 U.S. at 902. 
43.  Id. at 903. 
44.  Id. at 905 (“Petitioners here object to being pressed into federal service, 
and contend that congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal 
laws is unconstitutional.”). 8
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reached the Supreme Court, after the District Courts45 declared the 
provision unconstitutional and the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding no 
constitutional discrepancies.46  
The five-justice majority of the Supreme Court held the interim 
background-check provision unconstitutional due to the anti-
commandeering doctrine.47 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 
states early in the opinion that “[f]rom the description set forth above, 
it is apparent that the Brady Act purports to direct state law 
enforcement officers to participate, albeit only temporarily, in the 
administration of a federally enacted regulatory scheme.”48 The Court 
imported the anti-commandeering principle used in New York,  
protecting the freedom of state legislators, applying it to state 
executive officers.49 The Court summarized the anti-commandeering 
doctrine with new rigidity by stating that, “It matters not whether 
policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the 
burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally 
incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”50 
Regardless of the governmental branch that is directed to act, if 
Congress purports to issue orders directly to state actors the legislation 
is constitutionally invalid under the anti-commandeering doctrine. 
B. History of Sports Gambling in the United States 
To understand the policy effects of sports gambling, it is crucial 
to expound on its regulatory history in the United States. The 
American public and its politicians have had a cyclical relationship 
with sports gambling; decades of acceptance have consistently been 
 
45.  Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, dismissed in part sub nom. Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th 
Cir. 1995), rev’d sub nom. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Mack v. 
United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
dismissed in part, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d sub nom. Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
46.  Mack, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
47.  Printz, 521 U.S. at 933. 
48.  Id. at 904. 
49.  See BORDELON, supra note 13 at 133 (explaining that the Court was 
hesitant to distinguish cases on such a fine line between legislative and executive 
action). 
50.  Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 9
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followed by stages of strong regulatory legislation.51 Understanding 
these cycles is an important step in the analysis of PASPA and related 
litigation. They simultaneously illuminate both the detrimental side-
effects and the tax incentives of sports gambling in the government 
context. 
1. 18th Century: Gambling-Funded Revolution 
Gambling has been a part of American culture since its genesis.52 
In fact, all thirteen original colonies, many historical American 
universities, and even the Revolutionary War were funded by 
gambling. 53  In addition to engaging in general lotteries, early 
Americans bet on “pedestrianism,” a race-walking sport that was 
imported from England, and also “horse races, cockfights, and bare-
knuckle brawls” for entertainment purposes. 54  Following these 
origins, gambling was gradually abandoned throughout the 19th 
Century as the federal and state governments developed more efficient 
taxation systems.55 
 
51.  See Justin Fielkow, Daniel Werly & Andrew Sensi, Tackling PASPA: The 
Past, Present, and Future of Sports Gambling in America, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 23, 
25 (2016) (“The United States has had a complicated on-again, off-again 
relationship with gambling throughout its history.”); Brett Smiley, A History of 
Sports Betting in the United States: Gambling Laws and Outlaws, SPORTS HANDLE 
(Nov. 13, 2017), https://sportshandle.com/gambling-laws-legislation-united-states-
history/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2019) (“[T]he U.S. has witnessed a long tug-of-war 
between gambling laws, and people who want to enjoy gambling in various forms, 
including sports betting.”). 
52.  Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical 
Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C.L. REV. 11, 12 (1992) (“Two 
hundred years ago, government-sanctioned lotteries were common throughout 
America. Lacking a strong central government and burdened with a weak tax base, 
early Americans viewed lotteries as legitimate vehicles for raising revenue. Lottery 
proceeds were used to build cities, establish universities, and even to help finance 
the Revolutionary War.”). 
53.  See Smiley, supra note 51.  
54.  See Jeremy Martin, History of Sports Betting and the Point Spread, DOC’S 
SPORTS SERV (May 30, 2017), https://www.docsports.com/sports-betting-
history.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2019) (discussing early American sports 
gambling); See also generally Allen Moody, History of Sports Betting, 
THOUGHTCO, https://www.thoughtco.com/history-of- betting-3116857 (May 2, 
2017) (outlining the general history of global and American sports gambling). 
55.  Rychlak, supra note 54, at 12. See also A.R. Spofford, LOTTERIES IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY, S. Misc. Doc. No. 57, 52d Cong., 2d Sess. 195 
(1893) (Annual Report of the American Historical Society) (the Librarian of 
Congress wrote of “a general public conviction that lotteries are to be regarded, in 
 10
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2. 20th Century: Sports Gambling Scandals and Regulation 
Even as the United States turned away from lotteries, Americans 
shifted their focus towards sports gambling. The country was full of 
organized gambling houses that provided guests the chance to gamble 
on typical casino games, but also organized sporting events.56 This 
popularity, combined with little to no regulation, led to numerous 
sports gambling scandals, including: the 1919 Chicago Black Sox 
World Series scandal,57 a college basketball scandal in the 1950s,58 
and years, later the famous Pete Rose betting scandal in the late 
1980s.59 These scandals not only highlighted the immense popularity 
of gambling on sports, but also the need to regulate it for the integrity 
of the games.60 The federal government, in a constant battle between 
potential revenue and the negative social effects of sports gambling, 
eventually shifted back towards stricter regulation following these 
athlete scandals.61 
Reacting to the fear of organized crime, Congress enacted 
numerous statutes to put a stop to sports gambling rings.62 In 1961, 
 
direct proportion to their extension, as among the most dangerous and prolific 
sources of human misery”). 
56.  See COMM’NON THE REV. OF THE NAT’L. POL’Y TOWARD GAMBLING, 
GAMBLING IN AMERICA 169 (1976), (1976) 
https://ia802205.us.archive.org/4/items/gamblinginameric00unit/gamblinginameri
c00unit.pdf (noting that by 1850 there were over six thousand gambling houses in 
New York City alone, which equates to one gambling house for every eighty-five 
residents of the city). 
57.  Evan Andrews, The Black Sox Baseball Scandal, HISTORY (Oct. 9, 2014), 
https://www.history.com/news/the-black-sox-baseball-scandal-95-years-ago (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2019).  
58.  See Chil Woo, All Bets Are off: Revisiting the Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 569, 573 (2013).  
59.  See Jeff Merron, Biggest Sports Gambling Scandals, ESPN (Feb. 7, 2006), 
http://www.espn.com/espn/page2/story?page=merron/060207 (last visited Sept. 13, 
2019).  
60.  See Fieklow, et al., supra note 51, at 27 (stating sports gambling legislation 
was rooted in strong negative public perceptions that developed following player 
scandals and the rise of organized crime).  
61.  See Rychlak, Rychlak supra note 52, at 13–14 (“Throughout history, 
governments have been torn between a desire to tap gambling’s enormous potential 
as a source of revenue and a fear of its associated social ills.”). 
62.   Fielklow et al., supra note 51, at 27. 11
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three of these laws were passed including the Federal Wire Act,63 the 
Travel Act of 1961, 64  and the Interstate Transportation of 
Paraphernalia Act of 1961.65 The main purpose of these laws was to 
hinder the influence of organized crime on sports. 66  Additionally, 
Congress passed the Sports Bribery Act of 196467  and the Illegal 
Gambling and Business Act.68 Historically, Native American tribes 
have been given more freedom to operate gaming operations, but in 
1988 Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act that 
provided more regulation of typical casino games.69 Despite these stiff 
 
63.  18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961) (“Whoever being engaged in the business of 
betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the 
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information 
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the 
transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money 
or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of 
bets or wagers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, 
or both.”). 
64.  18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1961) (“(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign 
commerce or uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with 
intent to—  
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity”). 
65.  18 U.S.C. § 1953 (1961) (“Whoever, except a common carrier in the usual 
course of its business, knowingly carries or sends in interstate or foreign commerce 
any record, paraphernalia, ticket, certificate, bills, slip, token, paper, writing, or 
other device used, or to be used, or adapted, devised, or designed for use in (a) 
bookmaking; or (b) wagering pools with respect to a sporting event; or (c) in a 
numbers, policy, bolita, or similar game shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
for not more than five years or both.”). 
66.  Att’y Gen. Robert F. Kennedy, In Support of Legislation to Curb 
Organized Crime and Racketeering 18 (May 17, 1961), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/05-17-1961.pdf 
(“[T]he federal government is not undertaking the almost impossible task of dealing 
with all the many forms of casual or social wagering which so often may be effected 
over communication facilities. It is not intended that the [Wire Act] should prevent 
a social wager between friends by telephone. This legislation can be a most effective 
weapon in dealing with one of the major factors of organized crime in this country 
without invading the privacy of the home or outraging the sensibilities of our people 
in matters of personal inclination and morals.”). 
67.  18 U.S.C.A. § 224 (1964) (“Whoever carries into effect, attempts to carry 
into effect, or conspires with any other person to carry into effect any scheme in 
commerce to influence, in any way, by bribery any sporting contest, with knowledge 
that the purpose of such scheme is to influence by bribery that contest, shall be fined 
under this title, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”). 
68.  18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970) (“Whoever conducts, finances, manages, 
supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”). 
69. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988). 12
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 41 [2020], Art. 1
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol41/iss1/1
Fall 2019] Shannon 13 
regulations, illegal sports gambling continued and even proliferated.70 
In 1976, the Commission on the Review of the National Policy 
Toward Gambling reported that over two-thirds of the country 
gambled and over 80% of the population approved of that practice.71 
The Commission recommended, and Congress agreed, that the 
regulation of gambling be de-prioritized in politics. 72  In the end 
though, the Commission and Congress decided to maintain the then-
current state prohibitions on sports gambling.73 
3. 21st Century: More Regulation, Divided Opinions 
At the turn of the century, professional sports leagues waged a war 
on sports gambling.74 Sports leaders admitted that “sports gambling 
threatens the character of team sports.”75 Their worries proved right 
in 2007 when there was yet another sports gambling scandal, as an 
NBA referee was charged with intentionally influencing the outcomes 
of games for gambling profit.76 Congress once again passed another 
law, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act,77 to curb the 
booming internet gambling business and put more of a burden on 
banks to block illegal gambling transactions.78 The cyclical nature of 
sports gambling opinions once again led to softened stances on its 
 
70.  See Smiley, supra note 51. 
71.  COMM’N ON THE REV. OF THE NAT’L. POL’Y TOWARD GAMBLING, supra 
note 56, at ix. 
72. See Fielklow et al., supra note 51, at 28; see also COMM’N ON THE REV. OF 
THE NAT’L. POL’Y TOWARD GAMBLING, supra note 56, at 1 (“Gambling is 
inevitable. No matter what is said or done by advocates or opponents of gambling 
in all its various forms, it is an activity that is practiced, or tacitly endorsed, by a 
substantial majority of Americans.”).  
73. Id. (explaining that lifting the sports gambling bans would be unwise 
because it would provide very little state revenue and current tax policies prevent 
potential state-run systems from being able to compete with organized crime rings).  
74.  S. REP. NO. 102-248 at 4 (1991)[hereinafter Senate Report] (“Sports 
gambling threatens the character of team sports. Our games embody our very finest 
traditions and values. They stand for clean, healthy competition. They stand for 
teamwork. And they stand for success through preparation and honest effort. With 
legalized sports gambling, our games instead will come to represent the fast buck, 
the quick fix, the desire to get something for nothing. The spread of legalized sports 
gambling would change forever—and for the worse—what our games stand for and 
the way they are perceived”.) (quoting then -NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue).  
75.  Id. 
76.  Donaghy Under Investigation for Betting on NBA Games, ESPN (July 20, 
2007), http://www.espn.com/nba/news/story?id=2943095. 
77.  31 U.S.C. § 5362 (2006). 
78.  See Smiley, supra note 51. 13
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legality. Immediately preceding Murphy v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association, an increase in technological capabilities coupled 
with sports commissioners79 pushing for its legality created a strong 
push for both legalized gambling and judicial protection of state 
independence from federal government overreach. 
4. PASPA and Sports Gambling 
As noted, the history of sports gambling is riddled with peaks and 
valleys of regulation. 80  The Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act (“PASPA”) was enacted by Congress in 1992 as part 
of an upswing on sports gambling regulation. In this section PASPA 
and its litigation history will be outlined to better understand the 
context of the Supreme Court decision in Murphy v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association. 
On February 22, 1991, Senate Bill 474 was introduced with 
bipartisan support. 81  Then- Senator Joe Biden declared that the 
legislation was necessary because, otherwise, sports gambling would 
spread state by state and develop “irreversible momentum,” 
threatening the integrity of organized sports and harming youth.82 
With 13 states closing in on legalizing their own state-sponsored 
gambling laws, the major sports commissioners and the majority of 
Congressmen and women united in favor of PASPA.83 Senator Chuck 
 
79.  See generally American Attitudes on Sports Betting Have Changed, AM. 
SPORTS BETTING COALITION (2017), 
http://www.sportsbettinginamerica.com/about/ (mentioning the change in 
perceptions of NFL commissioner Roger Goodell, NBA commissioner Adam 
Silver, former NBA commissioner David Stern, MLB commissioner Rob Manfred, 
and NHL commission Gary Bettman).  
80.  See Fielkow et al., supra note 51, at 25.  
81.  Senate Report, supra note 74, at 3. 
82.  Id. at 5; see also Fielklow et al., supra note 51, at 30 (“At the time, the 
primary arguments in favor of PASPA were (1) protecting the integrity, and 
preserving the character, of sports; (2) shielding America’s impressionable youth 
from vice; and (3) restricting any further spreading of state-authorized sports 
gambling.”) (citing Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling: Hearing on S. 
473 and S. 474 Before the Subcomm. On Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the 
S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1992)). 
83.  See 138 CONG. REC. 32439 (1992) (statement of Rep. Hamilton Fish, Jr., 
Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“If a large number of States and localities 
make betting on sports a public institution, they are really incorporating it into the 
fabric of public policy and implicitly giving it the stamp of an official sanction.”); 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 74 Before the 
Subcomm. on Economics and Commercial Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
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Grassley, one of the few opponents of PASPA, with a keen eye to 
future litigation argued that the statute would directly impede state 
freedom, which in turn would lead to future Constitutional 
challenges.84 The Department of Justice raised similar concerns of 
Congressional overreach of state freedoms.85 Despite these legitimate 
apprehensions, PASPA was signed into law on October 28, 1992 by 
President George H.W. Bush.86 
PASPA contains both a “grandfather” provision that allows the 
city of Las Vegas and other established gambling areas to maintain 
their sports gambling business87 and a provision stating that Atlantic 
City, New Jersey can establish legalized gambling if it does so within  
one year of the law’s effective date.88 New Jersey decided to forgo 
this option; instead, its citizens voted to amend the State Constitution 
years later to make it lawful for the state legislature to authorize sports 
gambling.89 Following this vote, the New Jersey legislature used the 
amendment to pass the “Sports Wagering Law” that legalized sports 
gambling statewide.90  
New Jersey’s state legislation immediately came under attack 
from professional sports leagues and the NCAA. The NCAA brought 
suit against New Jersey Governor Chris Christie in federal court 
 
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 26, 52 (1991) (“There will be millions of additional 
Americans induced and seduced into gambling if this growth industry is permitted 
to take the imprimatur of the State and support State-sanctioned point-spread 
betting.”) (statement of NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue).  
84.  Senate Report, supra note 74, at 12. 
85.  Id. (arguing that there are additional issues with PASPA including: (1) the 
Grandfather Clause which allowed certain states such as Delaware and Nevada to 
continue allowing legalized sports gambling, (2) the fact that illegal gambling rings 
would now have a monopoly on the billion dollar industry, and (3) that federal 
intrusion into state decision making would interfere with state revenue in this case). 
86.  Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-559, 106 
Stat. 4227 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012)).  
87.  Id. §§ 3704(a)(1)-(2) (2012). 
88.  Id. § 3704(a)(3) (2012). 
89.  N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2 (2012).  
90.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A-1 to 5:12A-6 (2012), invalidated by Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013); 
see also N.J. Moves Towards Legal Sports Betting This Fall, in Time for NFL 
Season, NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (May 25, 2012), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/nj-moves-towards-legal-sports-betting-fall-
time-nfl-season (“We intend to go forward and allow sports gambling to happen, if 
someone wants to stop us, they’ll have to take action to stop us.”) (quoting Governor 
Chris Christie). 15
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claiming that the new law violated PASPA.91 New Jersey responded 
by claiming that “PASPA unconstitutionally infringed the State’s 
sovereign authority to end its sports gambling ban.”92 The District 
Court found no violation,93 and the Third Circuit affirmed because 
PASPA does not impose any affirmative action upon the states.94 The 
Supreme Court denied review in 2013 because PASPA did not 
prohibit New Jersey from removing previously enacted gambling 
prohibitions. 95  In its brief opposing certiorari, the United States 
admitted that PASPA does not force New Jersey to maintain 
legislation enacted prior to PASPA and it could repeal these 
prohibitions. In 2014, New Jersey enacted and framed a new sports 
gambling statute as a “repealer” statute that repealed its previous 
sports gambling prohibition.96 The NCAA once again filed suit in 
federal court.97 The District Court ruled in favor of the NCAA98 and 
the Third Circuit affirmed.99 The Third Circuit did not accept New 
Jersey’s “artful” attempt at making the law a repeal statute, instead 
holding that the law indeed violates PASPA.100 In 2017, the Supreme 
Court finally granted review to settle the crucial constitutional 
question that arose in the preceding litigation. 
 
91.  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. v. Christie, 926 F.Supp.2d 551 (D.N.J. 
2013).  
92.  Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1471. 
93.  Christie, 926 F.Supp.2d at 573. 
94.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. v. Christie, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013). 
95.  Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1472. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. v. Christie, 61 F.Supp.3d 488 (D.N.J. 
2014). 
98.  Id. at 508. 
99.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
100.  Id. at 401 (explaining that the 2014 law “selectively remove[s] a 
prohibition on sports wagering in a manner that permissively channels wagering 
activity to particular locations or operators”). 16
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III. ANALYSIS: ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE AND THE 
LIBERTY OF VULNERABLE POPULATIONS 
A. Section 3702 of PASPA Ruled Unconstitutional Due to Anti-
Commandeering Doctrine  
In 2018, the Supreme Court once again employed the anti-
commandeering doctrine, this time to strike § 3702 of PASPA.101 The 
court lays out three arguments in favor of the anti-commandeering 
doctrine: structural protections of liberty, political accountability, and 
its prevention of Congress shifting the costs of regulation onto the 
States.102 Although the principles were reasonable, the Supreme Court 
missed the mark when it failed to defer to legislature because its strict 
adherence to the anti-commandeering doctrine undervalues the 
negative effects the policy has on state sovereignty and its benefits. 
This section evaluates the Supreme Court’s arguments and analyzes 
the competing policy interests that should have held more weight 
during the Court’s anti-commandeering analysis. 
The most crucial argument that the majority employed is that the 
doctrine protects individual liberty. The argument was that the 
protection of state sovereignty is not for the benefit of the states, but 
rather for the benefit of the individual.103  As stated in Printz and 
quoted in Murphy, a “healthy balance of power between the States and 
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse 
from either front.”104 But, the balance between individual liberty and 
congressional oversight is delicate. Government has the responsibility 
to protect its citizens while sports gambling has addictive qualities that 
not only hurts individuals, but also extends to the families, sports 
leagues and communities.105 The anti-commandeering doctrine needs 
 
101.  Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1478 (“The PASPA provision at issue here—
prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling—violates the anticommandeering 
rule.”). 
102.  Id. at 1477. 
103.  Id. (“[T]he constitution divides authority between federal and state 
governments for the protection of the individuals.”) (citing New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)) (emphasis added). 
104.  Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 
(1991)). 
105.  Contra Barney Frank, With Gambling, Personal Freedom is Always the 
Best Bet, Says Barney Frank, US NEWS (June 1, 2009, 2:08 PM), 
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2009/06/01/with-gambling-personal-
freedom-is-always-the-best-bet-says-barney-frank (“There are people who believe 
 17
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to better balance current sports gambling laws with individual 
freedoms. 
Second, the majority argued that the anti-commandeering doctrine 
fosters political accountability. The reasoning is that when states are 
forced to impose certain regulations promulgated by Congress, the 
responsibility for said political actions are “blurred.”106 Individuals 
that wish to debate or change the regulation would not know who to 
go to or who to vote against in order to achieve their goal. In the case 
at hand, this argument bears little weight because PASPA does not 
actually force states to carry out any action. 107  The anti-
commandeering analysis needs to take into account this distinction 
even though the Supreme Court rejected it in Murphy.108  Citizens 
would know which lawmakers to hold accountable because Congress 
is the only political body taking action which is not a violation of 
federalism principles. 
Lastly, the Court argued that the principle prevents Congress from 
shifting the cost of regulation onto state governments. Yet, if Congress 
were to pass a law forcing state governments to enforce a policy, then 
the federal government does not need to weigh the expected costs and 
benefits of the program because it has no effect on the federal 
government.109 This bears no weight on the analysis though because 
 
that it is appropriate to use the law to impose on others personal, religious, or moral 
tenets, whether or not they deal with behavior that impinges on others. Obviously, 
society has an obligation to enforce those aspects of morality that protect people 
from others. Murder, robbery, fraud, and arson, for example, should be harshly 
prosecuted. But personal behavior that harms no one ought to be within the sphere 
of personal autonomy.”). 
106.  Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1477. 
107.  Brief for Respondents at 59, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
137 S.Ct. 2327 (2017) (Nos. 16-476, 16-477), 2017 WL 4684747, at *59 (“In full 
compliance with the anti-commandeering doctrine, Congress effectuated its intent 
without resorting to anything like the affirmative commands that doomed the 
statutory provisions at issue in New York and Printz.”). 
108.  Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1478 (“It was a matter of happenstance that the laws 
challenged in New York and Printz commanded ‘affirmative’ action as opposed to 
imposing a prohibition. The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue direct 
orders to state legislatures—applies in either event.”); see also id. at 1489 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the non-commandeering aspects of PASPA 
are severable from the unconstitutional aspects). 
109. Id. at 1477; see also Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 
46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1360 (2001) (“If our system of political checks is to rest on 
a foundation of popular loyalty, the people need to know when to get upset and at 
whom. The system requires a certain degree of transparency. It must be clear when 
the national government has acted, as opposed to the states, so that the people can 
 18
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once again PASPA does not force states to take action. It simply 
prevents them from sponsoring sports gambling. The Supreme Court 
did not believe in this distinction, but it does prevent the cost shifting 
that anti-commandeering principles are meant to protect against. 
B. Psychology of Gambling and its Effect on Vulnerable 
An unrefined and expansive anti-commandeering doctrine allows 
for tangible negative effects on vulnerable populations. There is a 
direct link between gambling and loss of liberty. If there is legalized, 
accessible sports gambling, certain vulnerable populations will have 
their personal liberty disproportionately limited based on addiction. 
This section highlights the psychological effects of gambling and its 
severe impact on susceptible groups. It creates a foundation to argue 
that these policy concerns outweigh the constitutional concerns of the 
Supreme Court. 
1. Sports Gambling Psychology and the Loss of Liberty 
Numerous scientific studies suggest that sports gambling is 
intimately connected to addiction. If states allow sports gambling, 
inequality will increase based on it taking the liberty away from 
individuals, families and communities alike. In May 2013, the 
American Psychiatric Association officially classified pathological 
gambling as an addiction rather than an impulse-control disorder.110 
This crucial distinction shifted gambling within the scientific 
community from a personal choice issue to an illness-oriented 
approach. This decision was based on neuroscience studies that 
proved that gambling and drug addictions are far more connected than 
previous research indicated.111  
Additionally, inequality plays a causal role in risk-taking 
behavior.112 The largest number of gamblers come from the poorest 
 
provide feedback to the political process that resulted in the action. Without 
transparency and accountability, political safeguards do not have the necessary 
information to operate.”). 
110.  See Ferris Jabr, The Science of Health: Gambling on the Brain, 309(5) SCI. 
AM.  28–30 (Nov. 2013). 
111.  Id. (explaining current neuroscience research in order to compare the 
release of dopamine within the brain “reward system” for addictive gambling and 
drug addiction).  
112.  “Inequality” refers to vulnerable populations. See Sandeep Mishra, Leanne 
S. Son Hing & Martin L. Lalumiére, Inequality and Risk-Taking, 13(3) 
 19
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segments of the population, as gambling is viewed as a vehicle out of 
poverty. 113  Gambling creates a perceived opportunity for social 
mobility and a relief from the anxieties and stressors of being poor.114 
Gambling can become a form of “economic predation” 115  as 
vulnerable populations can be exploited in order to create revenue for 
casinos, sports leagues, or even state governments. This vicious 
incentive cycle will create perverse incentives to increase gambling 
availability which in turn will lead to more addiction and poverty 
within society. The federal government has the ability to create laws 
that prevent the use of certain drugs in order to protect society from 
the various negative impacts of the use of these drug (i.e. addiction, 
crime, etc.). The anti-commandeering doctrine is a valid federalism 
principle, but it should not prevent Congress from acting on the need 
to regulate sports gambling. Just as drugs are regulated due to their 
addictive qualities, the federal government should be allowed to 
regulate sports gambling without a rigid interpretation of anti-
commandeering doctrine getting in the way. 
2. Impact on Vulnerable Populations 
Beyond the poor, legalized state-sponsored sports gambling 
would disproportionately affect other vulnerable populations 
including teenagers and young adults, chemically-dependent 
individuals, and the Native American population. First, in Italy, where 
 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 1–11, at 9 (2015) (“The effect of inequality on risk-
taking manifested in short time frames, suggesting that inequality is a salient 
motivator of risk-taking to which people are acutely sensitive. In everyday 
situations, it is possible that victims of inequality would experience persistent 
feedback emphasizing such inequalities (e.g., repeated group-based discrimination, 
stigmatization of the poor), potentially leading to even greater elevation of risk-
taking. . . . This study has important policy implications: Aiming to affect 
modifiable circumstances that motivate risk-taking, such as inequality in access to 
health care, education, wealth, and other opportunities, may lead to significant 
reductions in risky behavior.”). 
113.  Monica Straniero, How Gambling Contributes to Inequality, VITA INT’L 
(Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.vitainternational.media/en/article/2016/04/13/how-
gambling-contributes-to-inequality/325/ (“[P]oor man’s stock exchange”). 
114.  See Bol, supra note 4, at 65. 
115.  See Straniero, supra note 113 (“One thing is for sure: Gambling is a form 
of economic predation. Today, amid massive budget shortfalls, politicians are 
scrambling to find new sources of revenue in the hope to solve their economic 
issues. But while the reality of doing so is far from beneficial, the effects of the 
expansion of gambling on low-income and disadvantaged individuals have failed to 
receive adequate consideration.”) (emphasis added). 20
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there are notoriously weak gambling laws, a research study shows that 
youth are especially at risk of becoming addicted to gambling and 
even more so for youth in the lower economic segments of the 
population because of their lack of social support from parents and 
teachers. 116  Additionally, young people have more technological 
skills and interest in sports which makes sports gambling more 
attractive and accessible.117 Second, as mentioned earlier, alcoholism, 
drug-abuse and problem gambling share many diagnostic features and 
often times affect the same individuals.118 Third, Native American 
populations have traditionally been given control of gambling markets 
without state regulation. This is a form of reparation on the part of the 
United States government for the previous mistreatment of Native 
Americans. 119  If state-sponsored sports gambling was legalized, it 
would significantly cut into the gambling revenue of Native American 
tribes. All of these groups, which the Supreme Court should strive to 
protect, will be negatively affected by the Murphy decision. These 
groups deserve to be protected and not forgotten due to strict 
adherence to federalism principles. Simply put, state-sponsored sports 
gambling will harm these specific groups by leading to both decreased 
liberty and increased inequality.  
C. Perverse State Budgetary Incentives 
Every year state legislators scramble to balance the state 
government’s budget. They debate tax structures and revenue models 
 
116.  See Canale, supra note 5, at 3 (“Indeed, the lack of social support might 
exacerbate the impact of income inequality on adolescent problem gambling. Thus, 
the present study intended to clarify the additive role of social support and macro-
level factors related to adolescent gambling severity.”). 
117.  See Carmen Messerlian, et al., Gambling, Youth and the Internet: Should 
We Be Concerned?, 13 THE CANADIAN CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY REV. 
3, 5 (Feb. 2004) (“Governments, the industry and the public have a responsibility to 
protect youth from potentially harmful products and activities. Public policy should 
reflect the changing social climate and aim to protect youth from access to gambling 
products and exposure to gambling promotion.”); see also John Warren Kindt & 
Thomas Asmar, College and Amateur Sports Gambling: Gambling Away Our 
Youth?, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 221 (2002). 
118.  Justin D. Wareham & Marc N. Potenza, Pathological Gambling and 
Substance Use Disorders, 36(5) AM. J. DRUG ALCOHOL ABUSE 242–47 (2010). 
119.  See generally Eric S. Lent, Are States Beating the House?: The Validity of 
Tribal-State Revenue Sharing Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 451, 453–54 (2003) (Outlining the decision in California v. Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians, Native American gaming legislation (Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act), and the history of Native American gaming).  21
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to eventually compromise on a balanced budget. Due to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Murphy, state legislators can now legalize sports 
gambling in order to boost revenue. This creates a perverse incentive 
for states to legalize sports gambling which preys on the 
vulnerabilities in society in order to create revenue to assist in 
balancing the state’s budget. This section will summarize the key 
difference between state and federal budgets and discuss sports 
gambling revenue projects to assert that states are incentivized to 
legalize sports gambling which in turn disproportionately taxes 
vulnerable populations. 
1. State Budgets vs. Federal Budgets 
On its face it may appear that gambling revenue is new wealth, but 
in reality it is just current wealth being redistributed unequally.120 The 
issue created by the Murphy decision is that states can now create their 
own gambling schemes to collect “voluntary taxes”121 from gamblers 
in order to balance their budgets. State budgets are mandated to be 
balanced every year, whereas the Federal Government can run a 
deficit and borrow money to meet its financial obligations.122 This key 
budgetary difference means that state legislatures have the perverse 
incentive, balancing budget over protecting vulnerable citizens, to 
legalize sports gambling. It may appear as if individuals are simply 
using their individual liberty to participate in this “voluntary tax,” but 
it is not as simple as new tax revenue being collected from citizens. 
This scheme unequally redistributes wealth from society’s poorest to 
the government. State legislatures know about the negative health and 
policy effects of gambling on vulnerable populations but are still 
incentivized to collect the vast revenues created by sports gambling to 
meet the requirement of a balanced budget.123 Congress, and in turn 
the courts, must be able to circumvent valid federalism principles in 
order to protect society from these perverse incentives associated with 
state-sponsored gambling schemes. 
 
120.  See Straniero, supra note 113 (“gambling produces no new wealth, only 
redistribution of currency on an inequitable basis.”). 
121.  Id. 
122.  The Difference Between Federal, State and Local Governments’ Budgets, 
GOVSPEND, https://www.govspend.com/2017/11/14/the-difference-between-
federal-state-and-local-governments-budgets/.  
123.  Straniero, supra note 113 (“Raising more revenues using voluntary taxes 
is politically easier than cutting spending, (benefits), or raising income taxes, 
property taxes, general sales taxes, or other unpopular taxes.”). 22
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2. Sports Gambling Effect on State Revenue 
There are currently eight states that have legalized sports 
gambling and twenty-three states with proposed sports gambling 
legislation.124 In its first year of legalized gambling, Pennsylvania has 
brought in $385 million dollars from primarily up front licensing fees 
as well as from online casino, sportsbooks, mini-casino auction profits 
and tax revenue from lottery expansion and daily fantasy sports.125 
Similarly, New Jersey has also had explosive growth since state-
sponsored sports gambling was legalized.126 Examining the data from 
this early-adopting state makes two things clear: (1) there is a lot of 
money to be made, and (2) the market is continually growing. 
 
Many economic analysts believe that legalized sports gambling 
will have a limited impact on fixing state budget problems.127 Sports 
 
124.  Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of 
Where Every State Stands, ESPN (Aug. 2, 2019), 
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/gambling-sports-betting-bill-
tracker-all-50-states.  
125. Chris Murphy, Gambling Fills the Gaps in Pennsylvania State Budget, 
SBC AMERICA (Dec. 10, 2018), https://sbcamericas.com/2018/12/10/gambling-
fills-the-gaps-in-pennsylvania-state-budget/.  
126.  Sports Betting Revenue 2019, THE LINES, 
https://www.thelines.com/betting/revenue/.  
127.  Paul Davidson, Supreme Court Sports Betting Decision is Unlikely to Fix 
State Budget Problems, USA TODAY (May 14, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/05/14/supreme-court-sports-betting-
ruling-unlikely-relieve-budget-crises/609317002/ (“A study last year by Oxford 
Economics for the American Gaming Association found that legalizing sports 
betting would generate $3.4 billion in state and local tax revenue across the country. 
 
Month Total Wagered Total 
Revenue 
June 2018 $16.4 million $3.5 million 
July 2018 $40.7 million $3.8 million 
August 2018 $95.6 million $9.2 million 
   September 2018 $184 million $23.9 million 
October 2018 $260.7 million $11.7 million 
November 2018 $330 million $21.2 million 
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gambling only makes up a small fraction of traditional casino earnings 
and an even smaller proportion of what would be taxed if it were a 
private enterprise.128 This skepticism of the workability of balancing 
a budget via gambling revenue does not mean that state governments 
will not be incentivized to collect revenue by the millions from 
gambling citizens. Although the revenue may only cover a small 
fraction of the total budget, states will continue to have economic 
incentive to legalize sports gambling. 
D. Potential Judicial Solutions to Balance Federalism Concerns 
and Policy 
The Murphy decision highlights the need for a reasonable solution 
to prevent Federalism concerns from mitigating Congressional policy 
interests. Opening up the floodgates of legalized sports gambling 
allows state legislatures to prey on vulnerable groups. The only thing 
preventing Congress from enacting PASPA is the judicial backlash 
based on the anti-commandeering doctrine. This section analyzes 
various judicial solutions, including the avoidance doctrine, the 
severability doctrine, the necessary and proper clause, and the 
commerce clause. These judicial solutions will allow courts to 
circumvent the anti-commandeering doctrine when interpreting 
statutes to protect these vulnerable groups without overstepping state 
sovereignty.  
1. Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine  
The avoidance canon seeks to balance the protection of 
constitutional rules while also showing respect for the actions of 
elected officials129 by presuming that Congress intends to enact laws 
that are constitutional.130 While interpreting a statute and analyzing its 
validity, a court “will first ascertain whether a construction of the 
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”131 In 
 
But that would still represent just about 0.3% of all state and local government 
revenue, excluding federal funding.”). 
128.  Id.; see also Michelle Minton, Congress Already Ruined Sports Betting 
Once; Don’t Let Them Do It Again, WASHINGTON EXAMINER (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/congress-already-ruined-
sports-betting-once-dont-let-them-do-it-again.  
129.  Gunnar P. Seaquist, The Constitutional Avoidance Canon of Statutory 
Construction, 71 THE ADVOC. (TEXAS) 25, 25 (2015). 
130.  See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000). 
131.  Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936). 24
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recent jurisprudence courts have been less willing to strike down 
statutes if they can be construed to avoid constitutional difficulty.132  
The respondents in Murphy made the argument that the courts had 
over-expanded the term “authorize” which violated the avoidance 
doctrine. 133  The Supreme Court reasoned that even the alternate 
interpretation of “authorize,” that it did not force state legislatures to 
carry out any specific action, made the statute a violation of the anti-
commandeering doctrine. 134  Even though the Court rejected the 
respondent’s argument, they did admit that Congress could regulate 
sports gambling directly. 135  It could have been argued that an 
alternative reading of PASPA shows that Congress was planning to 
regulate sports gambling directly, rather than forcing the states to act. 
In future anti-commandeering doctrine cases litigants could employ 
this strategy and use the doctrine in order to avoid the constitutional 
problem and presumably get closer to the intent of the legislature. In 
the vast majority of cases, Congress is not trying to overstep the 
freedom of states, and this doctrine will allow courts to let their 
opinions follow this assumption. Avoidance doctrine may be useful to 
avoid striking statutes due to anti-commandeering decisions. 
2. Severability Doctrine 
The severability doctrine, the main interpretive tool the dissent 
argues for in Murphy, allows courts to cut out any unconstitutional 
sections of a statute and leave the remaining statutory provisions 
intact.136 The court must decide if the legislature would have intended 
 
132.  Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern 
Supreme Court and Legal Change, HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2111 (2015) (“The canon 
has thus in practice morphed into a twisted corollary: a court should not strike down 
a law if it can be judicially rewritten to avoid constitutional difficulty. We call this 
move the ‘rewriting power.’ … [T]he rewriting power…we call active avoidance—
using the avoidance canon to usher in legal change.”). 
133.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 107 at 38 (“Courts are supposed to read 
statutes to avoid constitutional difficulties, not to create them.”). The Respondents 
believed that the Court expanded “authorize” to entail commandeering when they 
could have interpreted the word more simply to avoid the Constitutional difficulty. 
134.  Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1475 (“The plausibility of the alternative 
interpretations is debatable, but even if the law could be interpreted as respondents 
and the United States suggest, it would still violate the anticommandeering 
principle. . . .”). 
135.  Id. at 1484–85 (“Congress can regulate sports gambling directly, but if it 
elects not to do so, each State is free to act on its own.”). 
136.  See David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 639, 639 (2008). 25
Shannon: The Federalism Jackpot in Murphy v. NCAA: Going All In On Anti-Co
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
26 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. [41 
the valid remaining sections to stand on their own after striking 
another part of the statute for being unconstitutional.137 The Supreme 
Court in Murphy decided that the Congress that enacted PASPA 
would likely not want to sever the rest of the statute from §3702(1).138 
Although the Court has reasoned analysis, §3702(2) could hold its 
own if §3702(1) was removed from the statute. This would simply 
prevent private citizens from operating sports gambling businesses 
without commandeering state authority. If this severability analysis 
was accepted by the courts and sports gambling was legalized in 
certain states, it would mirror the current issue regarding marijuana 
legislation. Private actors who operate a sports gambling business 
would be following state laws but be in violation of federal law. In 
short, this severability solution is an incomplete means to protect 
federal law from anti-commandeering principles.  
3. Necessary and Proper Clause and the Commerce Clause 
Under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, Congress has the 
power "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or 
any Department or Officer thereof.”139 Additionally, the Commerce 
Clause states that Congress shall have the power “to regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes.” 140  The post-New Deal courts enlarged 
Congressional power by employing both of these Constitutional 
 
137.  Id. at 645 (“[A] court should refrain from invalidating more of the statute 
than is necessary. . . . [W]henever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable 
provisions separable from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this 
court to so declare, and to maintain the act in so far as it is valid.”) (quoting Alaska 
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 683 (1987)); see also Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S.320, 329 (2006) (“[W]e try not to nullify 
more of a legislature’s work than is necessary, for we know that ‘[a] ruling of 
unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the 
people.’”). 
138.  Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1483 (explaining that Congress intended the 
provisions in §3702(1) and §3702(2) to work together in suing the state that 
authorized and private entity that owned the gambling operation). 
139.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
140.  Id.  26
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principles. The courts upheld various federal statutes as necessary and 
proper means to achieve legitimate commerce regulation.141  
It is not disputed that Congress may employ the commerce power 
in order to regulate gambling nationwide. 142  The specific 
commandeering issues within PASPA takes more critical analysis. A 
large amount of sports gambling takes place on the internet, with large 
sums of money crossing borders.143 The respondents in Murphy could 
have argued that because of these statistics and the fact that the sports 
franchises are located in different states, sports gambling qualifies as 
interstate commerce. Next, they would argue that because of the 
harmful effects of gambling, much like illegal drugs, it is necessary 
and proper for Congress to control this interstate commerce. This 
constitutional backdoor argument is slightly attenuated but could be 
an additional way to avoid the anti-commandeering doctrine. All in 
all though, this would not solve the overarching issue of a broadened 
anti-commandeering doctrine preventing the Supreme Court from 
reasoned analysis to protect individual liberty. 
4. Reasonable Constraints on Anti-Commandeering 
Even if these methods could be used in different factual 
circumstances, is it realistic for the judicial branch to turn a blind eye 
to the loss of liberty in vulnerable populations in order to follow a 
doctrine not rooted in the text of the Constitution? There should be a 
shift in anti-commandeering doctrine analysis that allows the Court to 
realistically protect against harmful policy and yet still protect the 
aims of the doctrine. 
The best solution to balance federalism and policy considerations 
is to set reasonable and articulable bounds on the anti-commandeering 
 
141.  Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 795, 807–08 (1996) (“[T]he New Deal Court’s own constitutional justification 
for its radical expansion of the scope of federal power over commerce was that the 
congressional measures in question were valid exercises of the power granted by 
the Necessary and Proper Clause and were not direct exercises of the power to 
regulate commerce among the several states. That is, the Court did not simply and 
directly enlarge the scope of the Commerce Clause itself, as is often believed. 
Rather, it upheld various federal enactments as necessary and proper means to 
achieve the legitimate objective of regulating interstate commerce.”). 
142.  See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
143.  James Stocks & Co, Share of the online gambling market worldwide in 
2015, by product, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/248655/segmentation-of-online-gambling-
market/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019) (illustrating that online gambling made up 48 
percent of sports gambling worldwide in 2015).   27
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doctrine. The anti-commandeering doctrine has no explicit basis in the 
text of the Constitution, as it was judicially created out of federalism 
principles in New York and Printz.144 The previous legal arguments 
can assist in narrowing the doctrine, but strict judicial constraints are 
necessary to prevent the doctrine from stifling the protection of the 
vulnerable. The anti-commandeering doctrine is not completely 
unworkable, but it needs to be contained in a way to prevent judicial 
overstep into Congress’ protection of the vulnerable. 
First, the anti-commandeering doctrine should not be used to 
strike a law that does not force state action. This preemption argument 
was the respondent’s strongest in Murphy.145 This constraint on the 
doctrine will allow Congress to regulate certain harmful activities 
without forcing states to enforce the law. For example, say Congress 
decided to ban certain prescription pain-killers because they were 
found to be too addictive. If the law said that no state could legalize 
and set up a state-sponsored pharmacy for this drug, it would not 
commandeer the state to take action. Rather, Congress would be able 
to regulate a dangerous drug and prevent its use without state 
interference. This simple solution will allow Congress to weigh the 
difficult policy decisions without forcing the state to take any actions 
that the anti-commandeering doctrine is meant to protect.  
Next, and most importantly, the judicial branch should have the 
ability to step in to protect citizens from state law taking away their 
liberty. If states have a perverse incentive to create a harmful law, the 
anti-commandeering doctrine should not create a judicial blockade 
preventing Congress from stopping it. One of the main mischiefs that 
the anti-commandeering doctrine is meant to protect against is 
government tyranny and the loss of individual liberty. Congress, and 
in turn the courts, should have the ability to regulate addictive 
behaviors that hurts vulnerable individual’s liberty even though it may 
partially benefit a specific state.  
Additionally, this action can be taken without forcing the state to 
incur the cost of the regulation, another mischief that the doctrine is 
 
144.  See SCHWINN, supra note 11 (“Students of the Constitution can be excused 
for scratching their heads at the anti-commandeering doctrine. That’s because this 
rule, which says that the federal government can’t require states or state officials to 
adopt or enforce federal law, has no basis in the text or history of the document. It 
has only weak support in precedent.”). 
145.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 107 at 18 (“While PASPA requires states 
to refrain from engaging in certain conduct and from embracing certain policies, it 
does not force them to adopt federally-prescribed policies or to enforce federal 
law.”). 28
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trying to protect against. Returning to the previous example, if, 
hypothetically, the California legislature legalized a state-sponsored 
pharmacy to help lower pain-killer prices and create valuable tax 
revenue, Congress could respond by passing legislation that prevents 
this state action. The legislation would be based on research that the 
pain-killer was too addictive and took the liberty away from 
vulnerable perpetual pain patients in the long run. This would prevent 
California from setting up the state-sponsored pharmacy and outlaw 
the pain-killer without shifting the cost of regulation onto the state. If 
challenged in the courts, the law would unfortunately be struck due to 
the Murphy decision. That decision emphasizes the anti-
commandeering doctrine’s protection of individual liberty, when in 
reality its failure to analyze detrimental policy affects allows for a 
decrease in liberty amongst the most vulnerable. 
The main counter-argument to slimming the doctrine in the 
context of PASPA is that it is consistently unclear whether a law 
protects or harms. It is argued that states are “laboratories”146 for the 
nation as a whole to experiment with the legalization of sports 
gambling. This allows individuals the freedom to choose for 
themselves whether they want to participate in a more regulated 
gambling environment.147 Although these arguments are valid, they 
ignore the prevalence of addiction in vulnerable populations and the 
fact that upholding PASPA will actually increase liberty for 
individuals and families.   
The judicial branch should reverse course and limit the anti-
commandeering doctrine so that it does not cover a situation where 
state incentives and the interests of the vulnerable come in conflict. 
 
146.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“To stay 
experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of 
the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, 
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
147.  This argument assumes that individuals will use illegal and less regulated 
means to sports gamble if it is outlawed on a federal level. See Gary Martin, Supreme 
Court Strikes Down Law Banning Sports Betting Outside Nevada, LAS VEGAS 
REVIEW-JOURNAL (May 14, 2018) 
https://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/betting/supreme-court-strikes-down-law-
banning-sports-betting-outside-nevada/ (“The American Gaming Association, 
which represents casinos, praised the ruling, saying it could snuff out what it says is 
a $150 billion a year black market that has thrived offshore and under the radar in 
the U.S..”). 29
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The valid federalism principles148 upheld by the anti-commandeering 
doctrine can be protected, while also allowing Congress to police 
sports gambling that disproportionately harms susceptible citizens. A 
judicially created Constitutional argument should not serve as a 
barrier to legislation that protects these individuals. The judicial 
branch serves as a valuable check on the legislative branches policy 
analysis, but the court should curb the ever-expanding anti-
commandeering doctrine set forth in Murphy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Without federal oversight, legalized sports gambling will lead to 
drastic societal problems by decreasing the personal liberty of 
vulnerable populations via addiction. States will be incentivized to 
authorize sports gambling schemes to create revenue from the pockets 
of the vulnerable. To prevent this from happening, the judicial systems 
must set reasonable bounds to constrain both the broad use of the anti-
commandeering doctrine and policy analysis. Are these neutral 
principles possible in the judicial system? In one sense they are not; 
when the Supreme Court analyzes constitutional issues, it simply 
appears to be doing the same policy analysis that the legislature 
undertakes. By strictly adhering to and expanding anti-
commandeering doctrine by shaping PASPA as simply an anti-state 
liberty statute, the Supreme Court ignores the negative effects of 
gambling. On the other hand, if a neutral principle were viewed as 
realistic, judges could realize the limitations of the anti-
commandeering doctrine and set articulable limits on its use. These 
limits include only using the doctrine to strike legislation that forces 
explicit state action and when the state incentives do not conflict with 
the protection of vulnerable citizens. Either way, by having a realistic 
view of the modern court and allowing judges at every level to balance 
state sovereignty and the necessity to legislate against harmful actions 
can prevent the harm of a rigid view of anti-commandeering. 
Otherwise, the same federalism debate will prevent Congress from 
protecting citizens in a variety of future and present contexts. The 
Supreme Court must fold on its Murphy decision, or else Congress’ 
hands will be tied for years to come.  
 
 
 
148.  Including, but not limited to, clear political accountability, preventing 
regulation cost-shifting, and allowing states the freedom to legislate how they 
choose. See Siegel, supra note 21. 30
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